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Abstract 
Welfare regulation in the European Union (EU) continues to crawl forward 
despite salient conflicts of interests. This paper addresses the fundamental 
puzzle of how regulatory competences may expand into the core of the 
welfare state and how conflicts are, eventually, managed in such processes. It 
analyses the EU cross-border provision of healthcare services. It is argued that 
the interplay between the Commission and the Court constitutes a powerful 
dynamic in generating new regulatory activities and in finding ways to set 
conflicts aside. The Commission draws on formulations offered by the Court 
in finding ways to manage conflict, for example by requiring ‘proportionate’ 
national policies which establish that national obstacles to free movement 
principles are ‘objectively necessary’. The paper concludes that law and 
evidence-based policy-making serve as powerful resources for the 
Commission in managing conflict.  
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Introduction  
Welfare regulation in the European Union (EU) may lack a formal political 
mandate, but paradoxically continues to crawl forward. It moves forward as a 
result of free movement principles, developed through the non-political 
powers of European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Commission. Inbuilt joint 
decision traps make it increasingly difficult to reverse the integration 
undertaken (Scharpf 2006, 2007). This paper analyses how EU healthcare 
integration is moving beyond the legal realm in which it has so far been 
advanced into a proposed administrative space of regulation. It thus examines 
how judicial interpretations feed into regulatory action, and how the 
Commission reasons regulatory actions and aims to tackle conflicts through 
the voice of law and evidence-based politics. The Commission-Court tandem 
is under examination, as well as the policy-shaping role of judicial integration, 
monitored by the Commission (Schmidt 2000; Schmidt 2004).  
  
Article 49 of the Treaty envisages that there should be freedom to consume 
services throughout the single market. However, directives to develop the 
application of this Article in the area of social welfare have been blocked. This 
paper shows how social regulation in the EU has nonetheless expanded, both 
in substantive reach and effective impact on national welfare systems. 
Healthcare is a striking example of how social regulation has progressed 
beyond the classic ‘regulatory function’ into the ‘redistribution function’ as 
defined by Majone (1994; 1996). The development of an EU regulatory state in 
healthcare comes up against intense conflicts of interests. While competition 
between service providers across national boundaries can be justified as 
increasing allocative efficiency in the internal market for services, competition 
also has redistributive consequences. Traditionally healthcare has been 
allocated within the national territory to those residing there. If patients can 
travel abroad and then seek reimbursement for the cost of health services 
consumed elsewhere, domestic practices governing the allocation of these 
services may be challenged. Of particular political salience is the way that the 
institutionalisation of cross-border service provision can make it possible for 
mobile patients to queue-jump and access treatment more quickly, as well as 
possibly obtaining treatments that are not available domestically. 
 
The second section of this paper shows how the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has played a particularly active role in this area. In its interpretations on 
free movement of healthcare services which will be analysed below, the Court 
has directly raised redistributive questions. What is a reasonable time for a 
patient to wait for a treatment when it more efficiently can be provided in the 
next-door member state? And on which grounds can a member state’s health 
insurance system deny a patient access to a treatment available in another EU 
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member state? It is shown that the Court’s responses to these questions call for 
a regulatory framework, proposing as they do that decisions about prior 
authorisation for patients seeking treatment abroad should be based on 
‘objective, nondiscriminatory criteria’. Such review of national measures is 
conducted against the principle of proportionality, which implies that national 
authorities are obliged to prove that policies are ‘suitable’ and ‘necessary’ if 
they constitute obstacles to the free movement of services. Furthermore, the 
regulatory framework proposes that available treatments should be 
determined by ‘international medical science’, and that waiting lists may be 
jumped when there is ‘undue delay’, and so on. All these formulations 
suppose that an international community of experts would be able to reach 
agreement on how these terms should be applied. The Court can be seen as 
formulating the issues presented in the cases before it in ways which are 
susceptible to solution through regulatory techniques, particularly through the 
references to expertise and the call for formalisation and transparency.  
 
The third section shows how the Commission has taken up these formulations 
in its proposal for a Directive on the cross-border provision of healthcare. The 
Commission refers to the legal reasoning of the Court and finds back-up in the 
authoritative ‘voice of law’ when framing a policy problem to be undertaken 
at Community level. It thus translates the policy problem identified into a 
‘regulatory need’. Legal reasoning, which points out the relevant issue at stake 
and the relevant rules to be discussed and applied, frames the issues raised in 
individual cases in more general regulatory manner, identifying regulatory 
activities which need to be undertaken at Community level. Such line of case 
law constitutes a strong platform upon which the Commission can argue the 
need to clarify and codify through legislation. The individual conflicts and 
issues are taken beyond the Court’s domain and into the administrative 
domain of the Commission. In this way, Court rulings move from ex-post 
interpretation into ex-ante validation of new regulatory activities. The link 
between judicial decision-making and the regulatory proposals is strong. For 
example, the Commission proposes to introduce an administrative review of 
proportionality which clearly resembles the Court’s principle. Prior 
authorisation is only justifiable if national authorities can provide evidence 
that such policy is ‘suitable’ and ‘necessary’.   
 
The obvious question – to which there is as yet no answer – is whether the 
Commission’s proposal will come to constitute an example of conflict 
management through regulation. In other words, will the member states put 
aside their objections, strongly expressed in the course of negotiations over the 
Services Directive, to the encroachment of Community regulation on this area 
of social welfare? The EU has already entered the area of healthcare regulation 
through several routes, including free movement of health professionals and 
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patients, the purchase of pharmaceuticals in other member states, coordination 
of social security and more recently the open method of coordination (Greer 
2006; Hervey 2008; Hervey & McHale 2004; Kostera 2008; Lamping 2005; 
Mossialos et. al. 2002; Permanand & Mossialos 2005; Palm et al. 2000; 
Martinsen & Vrangbæk 2008). For the reasons outlined above, the cross-border 
provision of services through patient mobility has redistributive consequences 
that are politically salient, suggesting that regulation is more likely to be 
blocked. The argument of this paper is that, whatever the fate of this particular 
proposal, the Court’s framing of the issues has created a significant impetus in 
this area of social regulation. 
 
Regulating Healthcare in the European Union  
Until 1998, Regulation 1408/71i was the main regulatory source for cross-
border treatment in the EU. By means of the 1408/71 coordination scheme, 
patient mobility in the European Union was primarily based on precisely 
established balances between some access to the healthcare supplies of other 
member states through the regulatory system of 1408, but firmly controlled 
nationally through the governing principle of ‘prior authorisation’. ‘Prior 
authorisation’ had for long constituted the effective means of national control. 
The principle lies down that if a patient requests to receive a publicly financed 
healthcare treatment in another member state, it has to be authorised 
beforehand by the competent healthcare institution. From 1998 onwards ECJ 
judgements seriously came to upset the established status quo between 
Community law and national legislation.  
 
How judicial interpretations led the way  
In a series of judgements, the European Court of Justice questioned the 
justification of ‘prior authorisation’ and gradually established that the 
principles of the internal market – and especially Article 49 of the Treaty - also 
applied to healthcare provision. The line of case law that the ECJ has produced 
since 1998 is a remarkable example of the Court’s ability to progress European 
integration into the core of the welfare state – and thus redistributive politics. 
In this way, judicial interpretations of the scope and purpose of the Treaty 
prepare the terrain for further regulatory action. We then find that Court 
decisions – and not political aims or visions – indirectly set the agenda for new 
regulatory competences of the Community. Court decisions constitute 
authoritative reasoning which is reflected in the Commission’s argumentative 
logic and formulation of proposals. In this way, the voice of law becomes ‘the 
force of the better argument’, through which the regulatory need and the 
proposed solution are developed. The ‘principle of proportionality’ constitutes 
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a central point of reasoning in the process furthering Community healthcare 
competence, whereby prior authorisation is evaluated against what is 
proportional. This has proved to be a powerful principle, since it gives 
grounds for the judiciary to determine whether the prior authorisation is 
‘suitable’ and ‘necessary’. The same logic of ‘putting to test’ whether a public 
policy measure is suitable and necessary is subsequently taken up by the 
evidence-based policy of the Commission, as will be demonstrated below.  
 
The judicial foundation of the regulatory need unfolds in detailed manner 
through a decade of step-wise interpretations. In the introductory judgements 
of Decker and Kohll, the Court laid down that healthcare was a service within 
the meaning of the Treaty and therefore in principle subject to the freedom to 
provide services across borders.ii The requirement of prior authorisation was 
found to be a barrier to exercising this freedom, which, nevertheless, could be 
justified under certain circumstances. The first as well as the subsequent Court 
decisions in this way put forward a delicate balance of, on the one hand, cross-
border freedom to provide services, and, on the other hand, grounds upon 
which to justify deviations from the application of this principle to healthcare. 
As an accepted departure from the general rule of free movement, the 
judgements acknowledge the risk of seriously undermining the financial 
balance of the social security system, the need to maintain a balanced medical 
and hospital service open to all and the need to plan nationally the capacities 
of the healthcare system.iii In this way, the Court entered the domain of 
conflict between the market freedoms of the European Union and the 
redistributive competences of the member states.   
 
The immediate impact of the 1998 judgements was modest in that they 
considered only a limited scope of goods and services outside the hospital 
sector, namely a pair of spectacles and dental treatment. Furthermore the 
initial cases concerned the reimbursement-based Luxembourg healthcare 
system. Although at first severely upset, politicians found themselves 
reassured that the impact was limited to rather specific goods and services and 
to particular healthcare systems as the Luxembourg one.iv   
 
Nevertheless in subsequent rulings, the ECJ extended its interpretation across 
the full range of EU healthcare systems. The Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms 
judgement of 2001v repeated - this time with regard to the Dutch ‘benefit in 
kind’ health insurance system - that prior authorisation constitutes a barrier to 
the free movement of services. Such a barrier may, however, be justified 
provided that 1) the decision on whether or not to grant treatment abroad is 
based on ‘international medical science’ and 2) an equivalent course of 
treatment can be provided in the competent member state without ‘undue 
delay’ taking into consideration the medical condition of the patient, broadly 
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defined. In the case of Peerbooms, the Court considered the right of Mr. 
Peerbooms to access a treatment which was not provided as part of the 
national healthcare package, but considered experimental by the Dutch 
system. The Court ruled that the decision on what is a ‘normal’ or a standard 
treatment has to be based on international medical science and not on national 
considerations alone. In this way, the Court envisages that citizens may access 
other treatments than those allocated in the national package. In addition, the 
Smits and Peerbooms cases present another regulatory question: what is a 
reasonable waiting time for healthcare treatment? The Court lay down that the 
patient shall not suffer ‘undue delay’; otherwise s/he is entitled to seek 
treatment across borders. Waiting lists as allocative mechanism in national 
healthcare systems are thereby restricted by Community law.  
 
In the Smits and Peerbooms cases and the subsequent ones, the Court assessed 
prior authorisation against the principle of proportionality.vi One could argue 
that in the concrete case, as well as in the cases below, prior authorisation fails 
the test of proportionality. The national measure to control healthcare 
consumption is not precluded as a matter of principle – there may be reasons 
for it – but its justifiability and objective necessity does not stand the test 
conducted by the Court.   
 
In the cases of Smits and Peerbooms, the Court further restricted national 
authorities’ discretion in granting prior authorisation by emphasising that it 
can only be a justified barrier to the principle of free provision of services if it 
is based on ‘objective, non-discriminatory criteria known in advance’ so that 
national authorities cannot control the procedure arbitrarily. Requests for 
authorisation must furthermore be dealt with within a reasonable time, and 
refusals to grant authorisation must be open to appeal (para. 90, C-157/99). In 
this way, the Court established that decisions on authorisation must be 
reasoned, reviewable and issued according to an acceptable administrative 
practice. They must be reviewed against the proportionate doctrine. By its 
emphasis on objectivity, explicit and assessable criteria and non-
discrimination, the Court furthermore presented its reasoning through 
regulatory formulations, later to be taken up by the Commission.  
 
A further significant step on the construction of EU healthcare regulation took 
place two years later with the case of Müller-Fauré & Van Rietvii. In this case, 
the Court issued yet another expansive interpretation by introducing a 
distinction between hospital and non-hospital care. In the case of hospital care, 
the Court restated its view that the requirement for prior authorisation is 
justified on condition that it is exercised proportionately and that the national 
authority has no scope for acting in an arbitrary manner. The matter was, 
however, quite different for non-hospital care. The Court ruled that national 
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authorisation constitutes a barrier to the freedom to provide services for non-
hospital care, and that persuasive justification for maintaining such a barrier 
had not been brought before the Court. Again the concrete cases failed the 
proportionality test.  
 
The Court proceeded further in the case of Wattsviii where it ruled against the 
UK. The Watts case considered for the first time, the implications of the logic of 
the internal market for member states that generally combine the provision 
and financing of healthcare, such as the UK, Ireland, the Scandinavian 
countries and the Southern Member States, i.e. National Health Services 
organised as benefits in kind. In relation to the earlier line of case law, member 
states with National Health Service systems had argued that such organisation 
in general shielded them from openness to the cross-border provision of 
services. Mrs. Watts had, however, paid for the treatment in the first place, 
which made it possible for the Court to consider the case in the light of the 
parameters of the Treaty’s article 49.  
 
The Watts case meant that the rights of the European citizen, here acting as a 
patient, were brought into sharper focus. The matter concerned waiting lists as 
allocative means, and their justifiability. In this case, the Court entered further 
into the question of what constitutes ‘undue delay’, and set out a reviewable 
criterion for determining whether a period of waiting is acceptable in the context 
of EC law. The waiting time must not: 
 
exceed the period which is acceptable on the basis of an objective medical 
assessment of the clinical needs of the person concerned in the light of all 
of the factors characterising his medical condition at the time when the 
request for authorisation is made or renewed, as the case may be  
(paragraph 79 of the judgement, emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore, the decision as to whether the patient faces undue delay in 
accessing services must be based on:  
 
an objective medical assessment of the patient’s medical condition, the 
history and probable course of his illness, the degree of pain he is in and/or 
the nature of his disability at the time when the request for authorisation 
was made or renewed  
(paragraph 119 of the judgement, emphasis added). 
 
Having enhanced the rights of the European patient by setting limits to the 
time period and the grounds on which the exercise of supranational rights can 
be put on hold, the Court went on to specify the institutional structures that 
member states must provide to protect those rights. The Court repeated the 
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conclusions from Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms as well as Müller-Fauré and van 
Riet, and stated that the prior authorisation procedures in member states 
cannot be discretionary, but must be based on objective, non-discriminatory 
criteria and allow for decisions on authorisation to be challenged in judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceedings (paragraphs. 115-116). Only when national 
administrations live up to these procedural requirements may their measures 
be found proportionate. Furthermore,  
 
To that end, refusals to grant authorisation, or the advice on which such 
refusals may be based, must refer to the specific provisions on which they 
are based and be properly reasoned in accordance with them. Likewise, 
courts or tribunals hearing actions against such refusals must be able, if 
they consider it necessary for the purpose of carrying out the review 
which it is incumbent on them to make, to seek the advice of wholly 
objective and impartial independent experts  
(paragraph 117 of the judgement, emphasis added).  
 
From Decker/Kohll via Smits/Peerbooms to Müller-Fauré and Watts, it is clear that 
legal decisions have been pivotal to the integration of healthcare. Within a 
time span of less than a decade, national health policies have been taken far 
further into the internal market than politicians ever intended, or could have 
predicted. That EC law applies regardless of the organising characteristics of 
national healthcare systems when the conditions of the Treaty’s article 49 are 
met.  
 
Furthermore, the line of cases on patient mobility is rich in regulatory 
language, despite its redistributive impact. The Court judgments formulate 
regulatory questions and propose answers about what constitutes a reasonable 
waiting time and what treatments should be available. By introducing the 
doctrine of proportionality to national policies, it becomes the authoritative 
institution to review and set the overall standards for how national measures 
fulfil such procedural criteria.- For a national barrier to free movement such as 
authorisation to be maintained, it must stand the proportionality test and 
provide evidence that it is justifiable (de Búrca 1993; Tridimas 1999). Judicial 
politics contains the same logic of reasoning as later captured in the regulatory 
politics of the Commission. The justifiability of national obstacles must be 
proven, be necessary and suitable.  
 
Instead of focusing on the need to balance national healthcare supplies, the 
Court underlines that rules and regulation must be objective, non-
discriminatory, and decisions must be based on objective assessments, 
formulated by experts who are both impartial and independent. In its detailed 
manner, the Court dissects the allocative mechanisms of the healthcare area, 
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offers new venues to bypass the restrictions of national supplies and build up 
new redistributive cross-border routes.   
 
Political responses and the first regulatory proposal  
When the European Court of Justice issued its Decker and Kohll rulings, 
politicians reacted forcefully. The German Government, for example, initially 
spoke out very strongly against the judgements. The former German Minister 
of Health, Seehofer, was quick to argue that the rulings would undermine the 
German health system. He further held that the Court decisions were against 
the preferences of the member states and that the politicians should overturn 
the rulings through a Treaty amendment (Langer 1999, p. 54; Børsen, 7. May 
1998; Politiken 9 June 1998). The former Minister found the Decker/Kohll case 
law revolutionary and argued that if Germany adopted its premises, it would 
be a long-term threat to the sustainability of the German health system 
(Spiegel 17/98, Fokus from 4 May 1998; Schaaf 1999, p. 274; Eichenhofer 1999; 
Interview, Deutsche Verbindungsstelle, 18 September 2001).  
 
This initial outburst is in sharp contrast to the subsequent political response as 
nothing further happened. No treaty amendment. No formal legislative 
reactions. Meanwhile judicial integration proceeded. 
 
In 2004, the Commission made its first attempt to regulate. It proposed to 
integrate the healthcare area in the proposal for a Directive on Services in the 
Internal Market.ix As a precise reproduction of the Court’s decisions, Article 23 
of the new Directive proposed 1) an internal market for non-hospital care, where 
the patient has a right to seek treatment in another member state without prior 
authorisation and subsequently have the costs reimbursed by the competent 
national institution, and 2) a right to hospitalisation in another member state, 
provided that the member state of affiliation offers the same treatment, and 
that authorisation has been granted beforehand. The health ministers, however, 
refused to have their policy area regulated as part of a general Directive on 
services, placed under the responsibility of DG Internal Market. Article 23 and 
thus the healthcare area was subsequently taken out of the Services Directive.x  
 
Conflicting interests in healthcare regulation  
It seemed clear that European healthcare could not be regulated purely on the 
basis of internal market norms. However, the Commission argued that the 
judicial decisions called for political codification and more administrative 
transparency. In September 2006, DG Health (SANCO) embarked on a 
consultation procedure on health services.xi The Communication called for 
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stakeholders to state their opinions on a set of questions related to the cross-
border provision of health services. This open hearing procedure produced no 
less than 280 responses from stakeholders, ranging from member states, 
regional governments, healthcare organisations, healthcare providers, 
insurers, the industry and even individual citizens. The many stakeholders’ 
contributions expressed a high level of split preferences (Martinsen 2007). The 
conflicts expressed in the many and varying contributions were, among 
others;  
 
 Some member states addressed the redistributive means of waiting lists 
and argued that by intervening in the criteria for the use of waiting lists, 
waiting lists were challenged as means of planning capacity. Contained 
in the argument is that prior authorisation and waiting lists constitute 
fundamental rationing devices. These both concern the control of in- 
and outflow of patients.  
 
 Another concern regarding national allocative mechanisms was that 
patient mobility challenges the scope of the national healthcare packages 
and the quality thereof. If some member states for political, medical, 
economic and/or normative reasons have decided not to provide 
specific treatment, mobile patients may access such treatment in other 
member states. Member states may experience growing demand to 
refund such treatment provided in other member states. Examples of 
conflicts are cost-intensive cancer treatments offered publicly in some 
member states but considered experimental in others, abortion, which is 
legal in some member states but prohibited in others, eye operations, 
spa-treatments publicly provided in some member states but not in 
others etc. Although it is explicitly stated in Court decisions, as well as 
in the subsequent Commission’s proposal that the scope of cross-border 
treatment only covers what the patient is entitled to in his/her own 
member states, this concern has been continuously formulated, 
presumably due to the doubt that the Peerbooms ruling introduced, 
regarding access to what was considered experimental treatment in the 
Dutch healthcare system (see above).  
 
 Another line of conflict was the one emerging between new and old 
member states. In the debate on the challenges and impacts of patient 
mobility, it has been argued that the new member states may benefit 
from the development as they might attract patients from other member 
states by offering price competitive treatment. The new member states, 
on the other hand, fear that they might have a considerable inflow of 
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen 
10 ARENA Working Paper 05/2009 
 
foreign patients which challenge their ability to provide efficient and 
high quality healthcare for their own population.  
 An explicitly distributive concern was raised that free movement will 
favour those who can afford it. The European rules provide that 
member states are only obliged to reimburse what the same treatment 
would have cost at home. Additional costs as well as cost of travel etc. 
must be paid by the patient him/herself. This favours those with private 
resources as well as patients from the majority of old member states 
where treatments are generally more expensive. 
 
The counter-position to the opinions above which was expressed in some 
contributions was that patient mobility improves allocative efficiency, and that 
enhanced European competition could lead to cost reduction and contribute to 
financial reform. By integrating foreign supply, treatment can be offered at 
lower costs through an internal health market.   
 
Conflicts also concerned the intra-institutional ‘division of labour’. Internally 
in the Commission, it was not straightforward which DG should be in charge 
of formulating the healthcare mobility proposal (Interview, European 
Commission, 2007). Having had to leave patient mobility out of the Services 
Directive, it was, however, clear that internal market considerations should 
not be the primary ones in the directive proposal. On the basis of previous 
experiences, DG SANCO had a sufficiently persuasive platform to take charge 
of the formulation of the proposal, which it was required to formulate in 
cooperation with DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 
and DG Internal Market. With SANCO in charge, it was communicated that 
the regulation primarily concerned supranational healthcare.  
 
DG SANCO announced that the proposal would be presented on the 19 
December 2007. However, surprisingly, on that same day the Commission 
decided to withdraw the proposal (EU observer 19 December 2007). Whereas 
it remains unclear what exactly triggered off the withdrawal, it is clear that 
many different actors and organisations worked behind the scene in the run-
up to the presentation of the proposal. What is also clear is that split 
preferences hindered the Commission.  
 
First of all, the college of Commissioners appear to have disagreed strongly 
internally on the directive and its principles. Various cabinets intervened 
against the proposal just before it was presented. Some expressed concerns on 
the impact on national health systems (EU observer, 7 February 2008). Others 
were concerned about how the proposal would be received by the public, 
suggesting that it could cause protests similar to the ones on the Services 
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Directive, which would be damaging during the process of ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Secondly, European social NGOs accused the proposal of not being 
sufficiently ambitious in the creation of a European system of healthcare 
regulation. The proposal would not effectively promote patient mobility and 
would not de facto ensure equal treatment, since patients themselves would 
have to reimburse the cost of travel and other expenses: 
 
Why does the EU directive not take account of other issues which are in 
the general interest of everyone living in the EU, such as equal access to 
affordable high quality health services for all, including particularly 
vulnerable groups […] That would show that the Commission 
understands the concept of collective solidarity, not only individual 
consumers’ rights  
(Fintan Farrel 19 December 2007)xii  
 
Thirdly, and likely to have been the key factor, members of the Party of 
European Socialists (PES) group in the European Parliament urged the 
Commission to withdraw the proposal, arguing that it would have 
considerable negative consequences for national healthcare systems. The main 
theme was the role of ‘prior authorisation’ as a national means of control to 
foreign supplies of publicly financed treatments (Dagens Medicin, 1 February 
2008). A central argument from members of the PES group was that the 
proposal did not simply codify the legal interpretations by the ECJ, but 
furthered the integration process beyond the judicial developments (Politiken, 
19 January 2008); 
 
The Commission moves one step further than the decisions from the 
European Court of Justice. It is highly problematic that prior 
authorisation is no longer required regarding the right to hospital 
treatment in another member state. That deprives the member states of 
the instrument of economic and capacity planning and runs the risk of 
financially draining the national healthcare systems, because the patients 
in this way can take money along outside their own member state  
(Christel Schaldemose 1 February 2008.)xiii 
  
PES members also strongly emphasised to the Commission that the timing 
was badly chosen while the Lisbon Treaty remained to be ratified in several 
member states (Politiken, 10 January 2008). The president of PES and member 
of the European Parliament, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, wrote to all socialist 
commissioners, expressing PES’s concern, just before the Commission was to 
present its proposal (Politiken, 11 January 2008). A recurring concern of PES 
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members was national sovereignty. That the national autonomy of the welfare 
state was severely challenged runs through the various arguments. Several 
times it was emphasised that whereas integration up to the point brought by 
the ECJ needed clarification, further steps were unacceptable.  
 
The final proposal – attempt to manage conflicts  
The December 2007 attempt to achieve inter-institutional consensus on a 
proposal for healthcare regulation failed, despite the careful preparations by 
the Commission. However, the then health commissioner Markos Kyprianou 
continued to argue for the need to regulate in the field of cross border 
healthcare, given the decisions of the ECJ. According to Kyprianou, the 
Commission had no other option but to regulate, being prompted by the ECJ 
rulings. Shielding behind a pro-active Court, the commissioner argued on the 
grounds of necessity; ’I don’t think [we] have a choice […] It’s not an initiative 
of the commission to create any new right, [but] offering legal certainty’ 
(Markos Kyprianou, Quoted in EU Observer 7 February 2008).  
 
On 2 July 2008, the Commission was finally successful in proposing the 
directive on patient mobility. The final directive proposal is not fundamentally 
different from the version set to be presented in December 2007.xiv The 
amendments seem rather minor to the December version, however, the timing 
as well as the reactions from the members of the European Parliament were 
quite different.  
 
In the proposal, the Commission tried to manage the conflicts and diverse 
interests previously expressed, by 1) referring to the ‘voice of law’, by 2) 
requiring evidence to justify eventual deviations from internal market 
principles and 3) by postponing salient conflicts to the implementation stage.  
 
Regarding the ‘voice of law’, the final version maintains its heavy reliance on 
the decision making of the Court. The need to regulate is presented on the 
basis of the Court’s interpretations. The reasoning in the proposal is therefore 
that whereas the individual cases are clear in themselves, there is a need to 
translate these individual rulings into a general framework and thereby 
improve their general clarity. The reasoning of the Court is ever present in the 
proposal and establishes the main justification as put forward in the 
background and preparatory work for proposing the directive. The proposal 
initiates with reference to the Court’s ruling and the judicial interpretations 
substantiate the need to regulate throughout the proposal with reasoning such 
as: ‘as the Court has held’, ‘as confirmed by the Court’, ‘as was recognised by 
the Court’, ‘as established by the Court’, ‘as already addressed by the Court’, 
‘in the light of the case law’, and ‘in order to achieve a more general and 
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effective application of principles developed by the Court’. In this way the 
Commission tries to manage the potential conflict on competences by the rule 
of law, and it tries to downsize political conflict by presenting its aims through 
the more neutral voice of law. Member states are left with less choice when 
decision-making options are so clearly framed and reduced on the grounds of 
the Court’s previous interpretations.  
 
Evidence constitutes the other frame of reasoning through which the 
Commission launches its proposal. In the first pages of the proposal’s 
background, various surveys, analyses and impact assessments are presented 
together with stakeholders’ contributions. In addition, a specific impact 
assessment on the proposal has been done.xv One of the main conflicts of 
interests in the proposal is whether prior authorisation is a justified barrier to 
the cross-border provision of services. In addressing this conflict, the 
Commission constructs a delicate balance. As in the earlier draft, this proposal 
reemphasises that prior authorisation is not generally prohibited for hospital 
care – but if member states wish to maintain a system of authorisation, the 
justification for such necessity must be evidence-based.xvi In this way, the 
Commission’s evidence requirement has strong resemblances to the Court’s 
principle of proportionality, according to which national measures must be 
appropriate and necessary. Requiring proportional national measures is likely 
to be just as powerful an instrument in administrative politics as it is in 
judicial politics, since it puts the Commission in the position to review 
whether national measures pass the test of suitability and the test of 
necessity.xvii  
 
Furthermore, conflicts are postponed to the implementation stage of the 
proposal. When member states in the future are to notify the way they have 
implemented the directive, they have to inform the Commission whether they 
have maintained or introduced a prior authorisation procedure. It is in the 
post-legislative phase the Commission comes in as authoritative reviewer, in a 
position to demand evidence to justify such barrier to the free movement of 
services.  
 
National authorities must provide evidence that: 
 
the consequent outflow of patients due to the implementation of the 
directive seriously undermines or is likely to seriously undermine the 
financial balance of the social security system and/or this outflow of 
patients seriously undermines, or is likely to seriously undermine the 
planning and rationalisation carried out in the hospital sector …  
(COM (2008) 414 final, p. 14).  
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Also it is noticeable that the Commission is there first with evidence-based 
arguments to the contrary. The Commission repeats that on the basis of its 
own impact assessments, it holds it unlikely that patient mobility will 
endanger the balances of national healthcare organisations. Thus the proposal 
represents evidence-based policy. Conflicts are put aside. Political positions 
will not stand unless they are accompanied by evidence, put in a scientific 
way.  
 
Furthermore, with direct reference to the proportionality doctrine, the 
Commission emphasises that the possibility of introducing and justifying prior 
authorisation is severely limited by the case law of the Court:  
 
In such cases, and according to the relevant jurisprudence, the 
introduction of a prior authorisation scheme, which will limit the 
exercise of rights conferred upon the citizens directly by the EC Treaty, 
must be proportionate and justified by imperative reasons as those 
mentioned in the same case law 
 (COM(2008) 414 final, ibid, emphasis added.).  
 
While the Commission admits that there may be exceptions to the general rule, 
it at the same time puts the ‘burden of proof’ for such exceptions on the 
member states. Furthermore, such proof shall be evidence based – and take 
previous case law into account. The restrictions on the executive autonomy of 
the member states are thus high. 
 
Finally, as with the justification of prior authorisation, the severe conflict on 
where in practice to draw the line between hospital and non-hospital care is 
postponed to the implementation process. In several member states’ hearing 
contributions, opposition was expressed regarding what was considered a 
crude Court distinction between hospital and non-hospital care. In the 
proposal, the Commission addresses this conflict and aims to manage it by, 
eventually, allowing certain cost-intensive or highly specialised forms of non-
hospital care to be defined as hospital care, and thus allowing – if justified and 
proportionate – prior authorisation procedures.xviii In order to manage the 
conflict between national and supranational preferences, the Commission 
allows for a list of special forms of non-hospital care to be adopted. The list 
will be developed in the implementation phase under the administration of 
the Commission and supervised by member state representatives under the 
Commitology regulatory procedure.xix The Commission thus proposes that a 
committee should , through deliberation, achieve a compromise between 
salient conflicts of interests (cf. Joerges and Neyer 1997).  
 
Inter-institutional dynamics in the cross-border provision of healthcare services 
ARENA Working Paper 05/2009 15 
 
With its regulatory proposal, the Commission attempts to bridge law and 
politics. On the one hand, the existing Court rulings already constitute a legal 
framework; on the other hand the judicial process is not in itself a regulatory 
framework, since it has no mandate to set up the regulator. The Commission’s 
proposal contains several such regulators, including a European reference 
network to coordinate healthcare that requires particular expertise or 
resources, a network on health technology assessment to support cooperation 
between national authorities and a commitology committee to formulate the 
list for special regulation of certain non-hospital treatments as described 
above.xx Giving form and task to such future regulators means that the 
Commission proposes to take the interpretations of the Treaty’s article 49 
‘incomplete contracting’ out of the judicial space and into the regulatory 
sphere. In this way, it invites member states’ representatives to re-enter the 
scene.   
 
Concluding remarks 
Welfare regulation in the European Union continues to push forward, albeit in 
fragmented manner. Despite strong political preferences to maintain national 
competence, regulation finds its way into redistributive policies.  
 
The key findings of the analysis carried out are that regulatory competences 
may be extended through a powerful interplay between the European Court 
of Justice and the European Commission. Through the way that the regulatory 
proposal is reasoned on the basis of previous case law, the Court becomes an 
institution which takes part in policy-shaping and frames policy options. The 
impact of Court rulings moves from ex-post interpretation of regulation in 
force into ex-ante validation of new regulatory activities. Despite the initial 
political response after the first rulings where politicians argued that the Court 
had to be reined in, this proposal is not braking or rolling back judicial 
decision-making, but instead codifying and in part progressing what the Court 
has laid down. The Court’s interpretations feed regulatory actions. The 
Court’s interpretations identify regulatory problems to be undertaken and 
lend regulatory formulations to the Commission. Proposing cross-border 
healthcare in the European polity, however, implies redistributive 
consequences and thus implications for the traditional allocative mechanisms 
of national welfare communities. Such implications raise severe and intense 
conflicts of interests which the Commission has to manage. It does so by at 
least three means: the voice of law, the requirement of evidence-based policy-
making, and the postponement of central conflicts to the implementation 
stage.  
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In the literature on the regulatory state, the Commission is often found to be a 
uniquely powerful agency (Majone 1996; Lodge 2008), in large part insulated 
from majoritarian democratic control (Mabbett and Schelke 2009, this issue). 
However, in the analysis conducted here, its power is conditioned by its 
ability to manage conflicts effectively. The Commission as the European 
executive does not act on the basis of classic leadership, as a political 
entrepreneur presenting clear visions and directions. Instead the Commission 
presents its regulatory proposal as a sheer necessity, reasoned from a coherent 
set of landmark rulings by the Court, which leave no other choice. Instead of 
being an entrepreneur, its strategy seems to act as a manager between strong 
positions and conflicts. As manager of conflicts, the Commission abstains from 
the ownership of the idea behind the proposal. Instead of putting forward a 
vision of leadership in granting rights to the citizens of Europe, the main 
justification for the proposal is that the rule of law has spoken. The more 
neutral voice of law is one prism to bend political conflicts. The other is 
evidence-based justification. Here the Commission relies on the Court’s 
principle of proportionality and introduces a very powerful means to evaluate 
the suitability and appropriateness of national measures. The Commission 
itself will become the reviewer and evaluating regulator. The Court’s use of 
proportionality has been described as the most far reaching ground of review 
and the most potent weapon for the judge to use against a public policy 
(Tridimas 1999). The weight of an administrative proportionality test may 
prove very heavy, since few national measures are likely to pass the tests of 
necessity and suitability when they run up against the fundamental liberties of 
the EU.  
 
The Commission has already developed a strong platform of evidence-based 
arguments. It is there first with its reasoned opinions, which set or limit the 
way positions can be presented. Political assumptions, ideological or 
passionate viewpoints cannot do it in the long run. The main conflicts in the 
proposal are postponed to the implementation phase which is where evidence 
is set to rule. Only what is justified by imperative reasons, and documented in 
a scientific way will withstand the burden of proof. The implications for the 
input-legitimacy of the political process are clear. The scope to build up 
political arguments is reduced before negotiations even start, since the 
argumentative scene is framed a priori by law and evidence. Whether the 
Commission has selected the right logic of reasoning and will be successful as 
conflict manager in the case of cross border healthcare remains to be seen in 
the negotiation processes ahead. However, one crucial factor which increases 
the likelihood of success is that an administrative, regulatory space is more 
tractable and controllable for politicians than the judicial space, which is 
further beyond the political realm. To re-regulate is the ‘lesser evil’ than 
uncontrollable judicial integration (Schmidt 2000; Schmidt 2004). For this 
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reason, politicians may accept the invitation to re-enter the scene and re-
regulate European healthcare.  
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